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1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
There is growing consensus (Bruton and Hill 1991,
Maxwell and Owens 1991, Riley and McClelland 1990,
World Bank 1991) on how counterpart funds (CF) can
be managed more effectively in recipient countries.
However, in practice, there are many procedural and
managerial difficulties to overcome. This case study
describes efforts to improve CF generation, collection,
management, accounting and reporting in
Mozambique, a country where CF comprise a large
share of government revenue and where government
and donors both agree that improved CF management
is urgently needed.
Such a study is useful from several perspectives. First,
since CF are such a significant source of government
revenues, the efficiency with which donor commodity
and financial assistance is converted into budget
resources is important from a fiscal planning
perspective. Second, the extent to which both public
and private enterprises and agencies seek ways to defer
or avoid payment of CF provides insight into the
financial health of the enterprise sector. Third, the
relationship between deferred payment of counterpart
funds by the beneficiaries and overall credit creation in
the economy requires further exploration, particularly
when the Government is operating within credit and
expenditure ceilings which have been negotiated with
the IMF and the World Bank. Fourth, the appearance
of quite different perceptions between the donors and
the government on what constitutes adequate reporting
and accounting and on the definitions of eligible uses
have proved to be areas of significant friction between
donors and government.
Counterpart funds in Mozambique, as elsewhere, are
local currencies (meticais) generated from the sale to
private and public enterprises of imported goods, or the
foreign exchange to purchase such goods, provided as
balance of payments or commodity import support by
metical (sing.), meticais (pl.) - the Mozambican unit of currency.
2 Account No. 1 at 8DM receives funds generated under the IDA
Rehabilitation Loans and related co-financing. Funds in this account
are normally frozen, although some portion are used to assume bad
enterprise debt by the government. Account No. 2 at BDM receives
most other counterpart fund deposits. These funds are directed into
the budget or back to donors, either through the budget or 'off-
budget'. Funds generated by the World Bank Small and Medium
Enterprise Project, the Household Energy Project and WAD
projects are deposited in the BPD account. These funds are used for
on-lending for certain types of project activities. (See Annex I in
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bilateral and multilateral donors. Counterpart is
generated from certain types of food aid, non-food
commodity aid, foreign exchange support and some
forms of project aid. Though each of these forms
exhibits unique characteristics, they all, in one way or
another, make foreign exchange available to the
Government of Mozambique or directly to private
importers ('beneficiaries') under grant or concessional
loan terms which is used to purchase foreign-source
goods and/or services. The beneficiary (whether in the
private or public sector) is expected to provide the
meticaP equivalent of the foreign exchange value of the
commodities or services into one of three Ministry of
Finance accounts maintained in either the Banco de
Mozambique or the Banco Popular de Desen-
volvimento.2 In theory, a deposit is normally to be
made at the time the import licence is granted and the
remaining balance paid at the time the goods arrive.
These CF deposits are toen used in one (or more) of
four ways:
j moved from the Ministry of Finance accounts into
the treasury for disbursement within the budget;
ii used to draw down outstanding parastal debt;
iii sterilized as a monetary offset against credit created
by the banking system;
iv transferred back to th donor to cover some portion
of that donor's local expenses.
2 THE MAGNITUDE 'AND MANAGEMENT OF
COUNTERPART FUNDS
Donors provide considerable foreign exchange or
commodity assistance on grant or concessional loan
terms. In 1990, the estimated CIF value of imported
goods was $864 million.3 In that same year, all donor
assistance to Mozambique (excluding aid in support of
the 'emergencia') was estimated to be approximately
$622 million. The total potential counterpart collection
is estimated to be approximately 60 per cent of this
amount,4 i.e., in the range of $365-390 million. Actual
Gowdie, 1991 for an interesting discussion of the accounting
implications of these three accounts.)
'The data used in this paper are preliminary and subject to correction
and adjustment. They should be treated primarily as order-of-
magnitude indicators.
4 The remaining 40 per cent is the estimate of non-emergency donor
support for government projects which generate no counterpart
funds. Ranges of values rather than absolute amounts are used
because of the preliminary nature of the figures.
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collection of CF in 1990 was in the range of $ 190-
225 million and total utilized in the budget was
between $150-180 million.5
Counterpart funds actually collected represent an
important source of revenue for the Mozambican
Government and also a significant share of the money
stock and GDP. In 1990, an estimated 30 per cent of
aggregate government expenditures were financed by
CF which also represented around 40 per cent of the
money stock and 15 per cent of GDP.6 But CF thus
expended or accumulated in government accounts
represented only about 50 per cent of the local currency
value of total potential counterpart funds that could
have been generated from external sources.
From an accounting perspective, the Ministry of
Finance is able to account for approximately 75-80 per
cent of the total potential counterpart ($285-
$320 million). The 'unaccounted for' balance (for
which estimates range from $50 to $100 million) may,
in fact, have been generated (i.e. paid by the
beneficiaries into the Ministry of Finance accounts set
up to receive these payments) but not yet correctly
reported, or it may have been uncollected (unpaid by
the beneficiary). There is some evidence suggesting
that a significant portion of the unaccounted for
balance can be ascribed to food aid arrivals for which
actual payment of counterpart in 1990 constituted only
about 25 per cent of the computed local currency value
that should have been paid. What is perhaps of greater
interest, only 2 per cent of this uncollected amount was
covered by promissory notes to denote officially-
sanctioned deferred payment (and against which the
government issued letras de tesouro). The remainder,
equalling nearly three-quarters of the local currency
value of programme food aid, appears not to have been
paid by the recipients, nor were deferred payments
negotiated. Since this food is sold into the market by
parastatals, wholesalers and distributors, non-payment
constitutes an implicit, possibly unintended, fiscal
transfer or grant and is, in effect, a (presumably
unwanted) non-transparent subsidy to these importers.
It is simplistic to assume that all counterpart that could
be generated will be generated. It is thus informative to
look at the nature and magnitude of uncollected
counterpart as indicative of the pace with which
counterpart is likely to be made available for future
budget expenditures. This may also suggest something
about the health of the enterprise sector.
'The difference between collection and expenditure in any given 12
month period being net accumulation in the government's
counterpart accounts. In 1990 this was approximately S40 million.
'Again, these estimates are approximations only.
Or the Banco de Mozambique acting as the agent of the ,Ministrv of
Finance.
The distinction between these two documents is not relevant here.
Both officially sanction deferred paYments by public or private
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In theory, the importing enterprise makes a metical
deposit of a portion of the value of the commodities at
the time the import licence is granted and pays the
remainder when the goods are collected from the port.
Payment is made either from the enterprise's own
resources or from credit obtained from the banking
sector. Often, however, the importing entity seeks to
defer payment of the counterpart. This is done by
requesting the Ministry of Finance5 to issue a Letra de
Tesauro or a Subsidiary Agreement8 against the
enterprise's promissory note. This is a common
practice in Mozambique, caused in part by the weak
financial and cash flow position of many enterprises
and in part because requests for deferred payment have
been so readily granted by the authorities. In 1990, the
total of these two forms of deferred CF payment was
estimated to be approximately $80 million - equalling
about half the value of counterpart funds actually used
in the budget.
The timing of the deferred payments is negotiated on
the basis of the pace with which the importer is
expected to be able to sell the goods to wholesalers,
retailers or end users or to generate revenue. Thus,
counterpart payments for raw materials and capital
goods will be deferred over a longer term than
payments for finished goods or consumer goods for
which sale and generation of cash flow will be more
rapid. The composition of imported commodities
financed by the donors thus has an impact on the pace
with which counterpart funds are paid into government
accounts.
In some cases, e.g., railroad equipment and spares
where the railroad continues to operate at a loss, no net
additional revenues are generated as a result of the
importation of donor-financed equipment, and no
counterpart can be paid. For situations such as this, full
'exemptions' from counterpart payment are sometimes
granted (totalling approximately S7 million in 1990).
The number, value and timing of such exemptions
obviously has a significant effect on counterpart
collections and revenue availability.
Counterpart payments are made by the importers into
one of two Ministry of Finance accounts in the Central
Bank (BD M) or into an account in the BPD. From one
of the BDM accounts ('MB-10') and the BPD account,
funds are then periodically transferred into the
Treasury for use in the budget.° Balances in the other
BDM account ('No. l')b0 are frozen and used to
enterprises of the full local currency value of commodities whose
foreign exchange costs have been covered or subsidised by one or
more donors.
° As noted earlier, counterpart flows in any time period include
counterpart expended by government plus net changes in the
counterpart accounts' balances.
'This account is comprised of counterpart generations from World
Bank Rehabilitation Credits - including co-financing.
sanction an equal amount of externally-financed credit
to the non-government sector. A certain portion of
MB-10 balances and, occasionally, of Acct. No. 1
balances are used to 'buy down' the debt of public
sector parastatals.
The Mozambican Government is currently operating
under the provisions of the Economic and Social
Recovery Programme (ES RP) wherein government
expenditures are constrained by a 'reduction clause'.
This requires that any counterpart inflows used in the
budget above a predetermined fixed level automatically
lead to compensating reductions of like amount in net
credit made available to the government by the banking
system. This is an important point: to the extent that
counterpart collections increase for any reason, the
result will almost certainly be to decrease government
utilization of credit from the banking system by a like
amount and to increase bank credit available to the
non-government sector. Since the government is
already planning to make net repayments to the
banking system over the next two years, any increase in
effective generation of counterpart will have the effect
of redistributing credit expansion from the government
to the non-government sector.
Looking at counterpart from another perspective, there
is no mechanism in place which automatically
compensates the government when actual collections of
counterpart fall short of projections, since government
borrowing from the banking system is constrained by
credit ceilings which are observed. The government
normally operates at, or close to, the ceiling. In the case
of Mozambique, projections of counterpart-derived
revenues over the next two years anticipate a healthy
increase. Should enterprise health not prove as robust
as anticipated and growth be slower, the ability of the
enterprise sector to generate necessary levels of
counterpart will be impaired and government
expenditures would be cut back, of necessity.
There are, in any regard, concerns about the financial
health of the enterprise sector and what this implies
about reliance on counterpart flows to support either
higher levels of government expenditures or additional
credit availability. As noted in the discussion of
deferred payment of counterpart, one reason for the
large number of importers seeking to delay payment is
that the financial health of many of these enterprises is
not robust. Inventories are believed to have been
building up, or there exist impediments to manu-
facturing and/or marketing which inhibit generation of
cash flow. Under these circumstances, one can infer
At least one donor, explicitly recognizing the impact on counterpart
generation and the potential for unintended subsidies when an
importer is selected who is unwilling or unable to pay the value of the
donor-provided commodities, is now requiring that an importer
deposit a portion of the payment at the time the import licence is
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that many enterprises in both public and private sectors
are experiencing, and will continue to experience,
difficulty in generating local currency in sufficient
quantity to purchase donor-provided commodities or
foreign exchange. This implies that:
î projections of significantly increased flows of
counterpart are probably optimistic;
ii present levels of commodity and foreign exchange
assistance exceed the real absorptive capacity of the
enterprise sector, and/or;
iii donors will have to provide more of these
commodities on a grant or subsidised basis - a practice
in which many, in one way or another, are already
engaged.
3 DONOR CONCERNS AND ISSUES
The donor perspectives on this and other problems
vary considerably. Some donors have not focused
much attention on the counterpart implications of their
programmes. Others have been concerned principally
with uses or earmarking of counterpart funds in, or
outside, the budget, while others have required that the
government demonstrate that the local currency
equivalent of the value of donor-financed imports has
been placed in a special account within a fixed time,
whether or not the imports in question have actually
generated CF. Complicating the situation further,
some donors designate individual enterprises as
recipients of donor-financed imports in the absence of
knowledge about the recipient's financial status.
Nonetheless, the donor may still require that the
government deposit the full counterpart value of the
imports into a special account within a specified time
period, typically 180 days after arrival of the goods.
Obviously, if the importer cannot provide the
counterpart, the government has to find its equivalent
elsewhere.t1 If, in addition, the donor requires that the
counterpart (or counterpart equivalent) be expanded in
accord with the donor's preferences or earmarked for
donor-selected purposes, there can be an adverse
impact on resources available for the budget or debt
buy-downs.
All this is somewhat theoretical, however, because it is
difficult in the extreme to determine what actually
happens. There are approximately ten donors whose
programmes generate significant amounts of counter-
part funds in most years. Each donor has distinct
requirements regarding how the commodities are to be
valued in determining counterpart equivalency,
obtained and pay the balance when the commodities arrive using
either the importer's own resources or bank credit. No promissory
flotes or exemptions will be allowed. If the importer is unable to meet
these requirements, the goods are to be auctioned to another
importer able to make such payments.
accounting practices to be used, types and timing of
required reporting on counterpart accumulated under
that donor's programmes, actual uses of the
counterpart and auditing requirements.
The donors can be separated into two basic groups -
those who require reporting from the government on
these aspects and those who do not. Until recently only
three or four donors required reports on the disposition
and management of their counterpart. Now, many
donors are requesting timely reporting on:
j the amount of their counterpart actually collected;
ii the extent to which the various conditions they have
attached to the use of their counterpart have been
satisfied and;
iii the actual usage of their counterpart.
The government, until recently relatively lax in
reporting, has increasingly been pressed by the donors
to account for individual counterpart contributions.
While, as noted above, the Ministry of Finance and the
Central Bank are able to account, from a macro
perspective, for most of the counterpart that
theoretically is supposed to be generated in a given time
period, the ability to track the status of counterpart
funds from individual shipments, stemming from
particular agreements between the government and a
given donor for a specific year, is considerably less well
developed - and quite burdensome. The Ministry of
Finance has recently been attempting to develop a
methodology for tracking the status of counterpart
originating from particular agreements and shipments.
This is intended, among other things, to provide data
for preparing individualized reporting to each donor on
the status of counterpart creation, accounting and uses
of that donor's counterpart. As of November 1991 this
tracking system was not yet operational.
In the November 1989 Consultative Group meeting in
Paris, the donors and the government agreed to work
towards establishing a common counterpart system in
which the differing requirements on counterpart
valuation,'2 timing of deposits, government accounting
and auditing procedures, counterpart uses, earmarking
and reporting would be harmonized and, to the extent
possible, unified in a common framework. This would
enable the Mozambicans to perform against one set of
guiding principles rather than eight or ten. In
December 1990 a progress report provided to the
Consultative Group (World Bank/USAID 1990)
12 In establishing the valuation of food aid, some donors have used the
domestic Mozambican price for a given commodity to determine the
amount of counterpart to be generated, some have used estimated
CIF prices, one has used a percentage of FOB, some have used FOB
or FAS prices. There was, at the time of the CG meeting, agreement
in principal that WFP or FAO would be asked to determine a
reasonable border parity price for each food commodity based on
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indicated that significant progress had been made -
including movement toward agreement on a system of
common valuation, development of a draft prototype
agreement to be used by all the donors, and
development of a set of common policy objectives to
guide donors and government on counterpart
management and use. These objectives, expressed as a
set of guiding principles, were:
j achievement of greater efficiency and simplicity
through improved harmonization;
ii support for the principle of 'budgetary trans-
parency', i.e., reduction and eventual elimination of
off-budget, unaccounted uses of counterpart funds,
and;
iii promotion of sound economic policies in the
programming of counterpart funds.
During the past year minimal additional progress has
been achieved by the donors and the government in
harmonizing procedures or reporting and accounting
requirements. There has been little use made thus far of
the prototype agreement format. The valuation of
commodities still differs significantly between the
.' In the meantime, many of the donors, who
heretofore had not pressed the government for accurate
and timely reporting on counterpart, began doing so.
In the absence of agreement among the donors on a
common reporting format, such reporting would have
to be done using many different, often complex
formats. In addition, reporting on 'uses' of counterpart
funds generated from particular shipments of
commodities would, as noted previously, cause major
monitoring and accounting problems. Since payments
by the importers related to specific shipments or under
terms of specific agreements often are made late, or
only in part, or sometimes not at all, it is difficult to
track these particular payments through the accounting
process, into the Treasury and then to specific line
items in the budget. It is, at best, an attribution
exercise, and, given the basic fungibility of these
resources as they pass through one or more co-mingled
accounts, an exercise in frustration. Nonetheless,
several of the donors are increasingly insistent that the
government provide them with reports on the specific
final uses of 'their' counterpart funds.
Another problem has been the insistence by several
donors that some portion of the counterpart funds
generated by their commodity support programmes be
deposited in accounts under their control to help cover
actual commercial rates and that all donors would agree to use this
value in determining the valuation for a set number of months (6 or
12). This system has yet to be implemented.
3 Thus complicating even further the already difficult art of projecting
counterpart generations and the revenue to be derived by the
government therefrom.
some of their own in-country expenses. In some cases,
these funds, which are in a sense 'granted back' to the
donor, can be as high as 10 per cent of the total
generations, do not necessarily pass through the budget
process and are thus invisible to those trying to bring
more order to the government's accounting systems,
and do not necessarily relate to development priorities.
There is need for the government and the donors to
resume the dialogue on counterpart issues leading to
simplified and common procedures for valuation, a
single reporting and accounting system acceptable to
the donors, and one within the realistic performance
capabilities of the government. In addition, the
government needs to replace the present system of
deferred counterpart payments with one where the
importing beneficiaries pay as promptly for the donor-
supplied foreign exchange and/or commodities as
would be the case for normal commercial imports and
where enterprises seeking credit to finance these
imports would go to the commercial banking sector not
to the Ministry of Finance.
CONCLUSIONS
Counterpart funds are an important source of revenue
to the government, but potential total flows are
considerably larger than actual flows. This is due in
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